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NOTES AND COMMENT
bankruptcy contrary to express provisions of the lease,2-quite apart
from this expressed abhorrence of forfeitures which the courts have so
clearly enunciated, it would appear that an action by the lessor against
his lessee is in every particular identical with an action against his
transferee rather than with an action by the lessee against the trans-
feree of the lessee in possession.
Mr. Justice Wagner in the case cited above,13 definitely classifies
this group of cases with the second group mentioned above and the
outstanding similarity, of course, is that in both cases the action is by
the immediate transferor against his immediate transferee and it is to
enforce covenants between the parties themselves and not equities
which result from privity of estate.
Where the landlord prefers to sue for damages rather than to en-
force his supposed right to have the estate forfeited, or where he pre-
fers to evict the transferee of the lessee, the situation very closely re-
sembles that in the O'Connell case, Supra, and we have seen how the
court reacted in that situation. It is not therefore unlikely that the
courts will so extend that reasoning and in all of these cases where the
landlord is seeking either to forfeit or enforce his lease, that the trans-
ferring instrument will be regarded as a sub-lease rather than an as-
signment. The situation then boils down to this: that in nearly every
case very slight differences in content between the transferring instru-
ment and the main lease will suffice to constitute the latter a sub-lease
rather than an assignment, particularly when the result will help t6
avoid forfeiture but that in the *sole instance where the lessor is suing
the transferee of the lessee in possession to enforce covenants in the
original lease, this rule will be considerably relaxed and the instrument
will be regarded in nearly every case as an assignment in order to en-
able the landlord to obtain the benefits of his property. P. L.
"CORPORATE VOTING TRUSTS-VALIDITY-BANxxKs"-In a recent case '
which involved the validity of a voting trust agreement (under statute 2)
the material facts were, that in December 1924, certain stockholders of a
12 Gazley v.-Williams, 210 U. S. 41 (1907).
"O'Connell v. Sugar Products Co., supra, note 1.
'National Liberty Insurance Co. v. Bank of America, 214 N. Y. Supp.
643 (Sup. Ct. 1926) rev'd, 217 N. Y. Supp. 67 (App. Div. 1926) Tompers v.
Bank of America, ibid.
The two cases are identical with a very slight exception and were con-
sidered at the same time.
'Sec. 50 Stock Corporation Law in part, "A stockholder, by agreement
in writing, may transfer his stock to a voting trustee or trustees for the
purpose of conferring the right to vote thereon for a period not exceeding
ten years. Every other stockholder may transfer his stock to the same
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bank entered into a voting trust agreement whereby the individual de-
fendants, who were directors of the bank, were designated as trustees.
In March 1925, an amendment S to the aforementioned statute was passed
which prohibited the stockholders of banks from making such agreements.
Prior to the passing of the amendment less than one-third of the
stock had been deposited with the trustees pursuant to the agreement.
Subsequent to the passing of the amendment the trustees obtained
further deposits so as to obtain a majority. The actions, brought by
a stockholder and by a holder of trust certificates,4 sought to enjoin the
individual defendants from voting and the bank from receiving such
votes cast from certificates issued under the trust agreement.
The Appellate Division in reversing the ruling of the Supreme
Court at Special Term held that such trusts were not void per se and
against public policy. It further held that in the absence of express
language in the amendment a statute is merely prospective in effect and
could not invalidate transactions made under or entered into prior to
the enactment of the amendment.
The question of the validity of voting trust agreements dehors a
statute is one which apparently cannot receive a categorical answer,
for each state has its own rules of law and its own policies shaped by
a medley of causes. Many states have neither statutes nor judicial
decisions upon the question propounded. 5
trustee or trustees and thereupon shall be a party to such agreement." De-
rived from sec. 25 of General Corporation Law. That section was derived
from L. 1892 ch. 687, which added a new sec. 20 to the General Corporation
Law of 1890 ch. 563. It was amended by L. 1901 ch. 355.
'Sec. 50 Stock Corporation Law. * * * This section shall not apply to
a banking corporation." Amended by L. 1925 ch. 120 in effect March 12, 1925.
Amendment added above sentence at the end of section.
'The voting trust agreement provides for the deposit by stockholders
of the Bank of their shares of stock with the individual defendants as
trustees and their successers and the issuance by the trustee in exchange
therefor of trust certificates.
'The followihg states have neither statutes nor judicial decisions con-
cerning voting trust agreements: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado (see People
ex Rel. Arkansas Valley v. Burke 72 Col. 486, 212 Pac. 837, 842, 1923),
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New. Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
The following states have statutes validating voting trust agreements:
Delaware, Corporation Law amended April 2, 1925 sec. 18; Maryland,
Bagby Annotated Code p. 582 sec. 102; Nevada, chap. 177 Law of 1925;
New York supra, note 2; Rhode Island, Laws of Rhode Island, Revision
of 1923, p. 987, by reference and implication; Florida, Cum. Stat. 1925, sec.
4120 (19) p. 782.
The following states have judicial decisions validating voting trusts in
some form or other: Alabama, Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92,
12 So. 723 (1893); California, Smith v. S. F. & N. P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47
Pac. 582 (1897); Kentucky, Ecker v. Kentucky Refining Co., 144 Ky. 264,
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The early authorities were inclined to condemn per se all agree-
ments which attempted to tie up a majority of the stock of a corporation
and frowned upon any voting trust or pooling agreement as void as
against public policy.6 But, wherever public policy is mentioned it may
not be amiss to quote the trenchant observations of a distinguished
English judge, Burrough J., "I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done,
against arguing too strongly upon public policy;--it is a very unruly
horse and when once you get astride it you never know where it will
carry you. It may lead you from sound law. It is never argued at all
but where other points fail." 7
The preponderant opinion stressed by the early authorities and de-
cisions 8 and the vitally important role they played grows out of the
clearness and force with which they announced the doctrine, that each
stockholder owes to his fellow stockholders a duty in regard to the
voting of his stockholdings and that the law will take cognizance of
this duty at least to the extent of not permitting a stockholder to irre-
vocably strip himself for any period of the power to fulfill it. In short,
the power to vote is inherently annexed to and inseparable from each
share and in each case the basis for the decision is that every stock-
holder must be free to cast his vote for what he deems the best interest
of the corporation; the other stockholders being entitled to the benefit
of such free exercise of his judgment each by each, and the recogni-
138 S. W. 264 (1911) ; Maine, Hall v. Merrill Trust Co., 106 Me. 465, 76 Atl.
926 (1910) ; Massachusetts, Bullivant v. First National Bank, 246 Mass. 324,
141 N. E. 41 (1923); New Hampshire, Bowditch v. Jackson, 76 N. H. 351,
82 Atl. 1014 (1912) ; North Dakota, Gage v. Fischer, 5 N. D. 297, 65 N. W.
809 (1895); Ohio, Griffith v. Jewett, 15 L. B. W. 419 (1886), modified in
Craig v. The Besie Furnace Co., 19 Nisi Prius (N. S.) 545 (1917); Penn-
sylvania, Boyer v. Nesbitt, 76 Atl. 103 (1910) ; Utah, White v. Snell, 35
Utah 434, 100 Pac. 927 (1909); Vermont, Thompson Starrett v. Ellis, 86
Vt. 282, 84 Atl. 1017 (1912) ; Virginia, Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins.
Co., 111 Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412 (1910); Washington, Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash.
241, 167 Pac. 909 (1911). The earliest case trenching on the subject is
Brown v. Pacific Mail S. S., 5 Blatch. 525 (S. D. N. Y. 1867).
The following states have judicial decisions prohibiting voting trust
agreements: Connecticut, Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24
Atl. 32 (1890); Georgia, Morel v. Hodge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S. E. 487 (1908);
Illinois, Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill., 170, 110 N. E. 373 (1915); North Caro-
lina, Harvey v. Linville Imp. Co., 118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896); New
Jersey, Warren v. Pim; 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 59 Atl. 773 (1904).
This note does not include testamentary voting trusts. Cf. Billings v.
Marshall Furnace Co., 210 Mich. 1, 177 N. W. 222 (1920); contra: Re Pit-
tock's Will, 102 Or. 159, 199 Pac. 633 (1921).
'Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24 At. 32 (1890) ; Cone v.
Russel 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847 (1891); Harvey v. Linville Imp. Co,,
118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896).
'Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. C. P. 229, quoted by Gray, J. in Con-
verse v. Sharpe 161 N. Y. 571, 56 N. E. 69 (1900).
'Baldwin, Voting Trusts (1892) 1 Yale L. J. 1; Smith, Validity of Vot-
ing Trusts (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 627; Supra, note 6.
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tion that the self interest of the stockholders will furnish the only
available guaranty that the stock will be voted in the interest of the
corporation.
While this rule admits its exceptions O it is nevertheless the rule
and accordingly, except within its limitations, voting trusts are held
contrary to public policy and void.
The suggestion that the use of the word "trust" is a cause for the
early indictment of voting trust agreements is not without force and the
trend of latter decisions is to uphold the validity of voting trust agree-
ments wherever the propriety of their objects and the good purpose of
their creation affirmatively appear. The voting trust should not be
condemned per se. The validity of the agreement should be made
dependent upon the purposes for which the trust is created, the powers
conferred, and the propriety of the objects in view.
The contrary view holds it unsound to claim that "all agreements
and devices by which the stockholders surrender their voting powers
are invalid." It is unsound to hold that voting trust agreements are
void per se, as opposed to good policy. The correct rule should be to
uphold the legality of the voting trust, provided the propriety and rea-
sonableness of its objects affirmatively appear, and provided that the
arrangement itself is honest and equitable. The trust should only be
condemned in those instances where the trust is created and carried
out in order to effectuate an improper, unjust, or monopolistic object.10
The minority view apparently is the more progressive and is
cognizant of the trend of economic advance, but, while based upon the
expression of opinion in some of the later adjudications," it seems to
be only a compromise with the prevailing opinion based upon its ex-
ceptions.
The voting trust is a mere contract and as a form of contract
it can hardly be said that because contracts have been used for the
'A separation of the voting power of stock from its real or beneficial
ownership, irrevocable for a fixed period is contrary to public policy and
void unless: (1) It is coupled with or to protect an interest; or (2) Made
to carry into effect some determined plan or policy to which the voting
trustee is bound; or (3) It is merely a pooling contract under which the
real owners reserve the right to direct the voting trustee. This exception
is limited to states where pooling contracts are sustained." Smith, supra
note 8.
"Wormser, Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts (1918) 18 Col. L.
Rev. 123. 2 Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, (1908) sec. 1269; 3
Cook, Corporations, (8th Ed. 1923) sec. 622; 3 Fletcher, Corporations (1917)
sec. 1705; Cushing, Voting Trusts (1915) chap. 3.
' Ecker v. Kentucky Refining Co., 144 Ky. 264, 138 S. WV. 264 (1911);
Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 165 Pac. 909 (1917) ; White v. Snell, 35 Utah
434, 100 Pac. 927 (1909); Frost v. Carse, 91 N. J. Eq. 124 (1919). The
latter case seems to have the effect of crystallizing the rule and if the
purpose is in accordance with the views as to commercial rectitude enter-
tained by the court, the voting trust is valid, otherwise it is void ab-
solutely.
NOTES AND COMMENT
purpose of perpetrating frauds that all contracts are therefore sus-
picious. If there is any fraud in connection with the execution of a
voting trust agreement, the remedies against fraud are or should be
sufficient protection to any defrauded party. Should any hardship result
from the operation of a voting trust agreement which was not in con-
templation of the parties at the time of the making, is it any different
from what may arise from the results of the operation of any ordinary
contract? Why should a man be released from such an agreement any
more than from any other type of contract because of unforeseen re-
sults and difficulties ?12 Further, to hold as some cases have indicated,
that a voting trust is valid only with respect to original subscribers,1 3
and that it cannot be enforced against purchasers holding under the
original subscribers, whether with or without notice, is to take the
backbone out of the agreement. For, whenever a man parts with rights
under a contract, he cannot retake these rights and recover his status
quo by alienating any interest in the transaction that he may have.
It is not the purpose of the voting trust agreement which the court
should scrutinize, but rather the actions of the trustees and subscribers
thereto.1 4
The apparent fallacy in the minority view is discernible when it is
considered that at the same time anything which can be done by the
majority of stockholders acting through a trustee can equally well be
done by their acting in unison without the interposition of a trustee or
a voting trust agreement. Is the trustee in a better position to pilfer the
corporation because of a trust agreement than the majority stockholders
are before the execution of a trust agreement? On the contrary may it
not be presumed that because of the trustee's fiduciary relationship the
logical criterion should be to recognize the validity of his appointment
but scrutinize his actions?
Legislative sanction is undoubtedly the best recognition of this bit
of corporate mechanism. 1 5  In the larger corporations especially, a
concentrated voting power, invariably essential to the corporate exist-
ence, is impossible except by such devices. The wide diffiusion of vot-
ing power and its vices becomes distinct and detrimental in expansion
and reorganization policies. Voting trusts have continually been used
to effect such situations with success.16 In fact, is not every close cor-
2 Cottrell v. Smokeless Fuel Co., 148 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 4th 1906);
Mathews v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 154 N. Y. 449, 48 N. E. 751 (1897);
3 Williston (1924), 3337.
"White v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 178, 28 At. 75
(1893).
" Finkelstein, Voting Trust Agreements (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 324.
" Supra, note 5.
" 3 Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations, (1920) 146; Daggert,
Railroad Reorganization (1908) form, Gerstenberg, Material of Corporate
Finance (4th ed. 1922) 91, 966; see also International Harvester Co.
voting trust agreement in reorganization policy. Dewing Financial Policy
of Corporation (2nd ed. 1926) 617.
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poration a voting trust? And, while the voting trust agreement is not
without its dangers, the very concentration of powers granted by it has
rarely been abused.
The increasingly constant use of voting trust agreements in the
present day trend of business suggests their necessity and "whatever
methods may be devised by lawyers or by business men for the adequate
protection of their interests, should not be frowned upon by the courts
for no better reason than some supposed 'public policy' is infringed.
This is a situation which must be governed by rules rather than by
standards of law. Considerations of public policy in. such cases are
best left to the legislature." 17
However, it has been the general policy of organized governments
to treat the function of banking as one in which the public has a direct
interest.' 8 Banking corporations have been set apart and distinguished
by certain specific requirements as to the manner of organization, dis-
ability against issuing non-voting stock, the qualifications, duties, and
liabilities of share-holders, directors and other officers, etc., in fact, the
mere enactment of the Banking Law conclusively indicates the intention
of the Legislature to classify banking corporations as distinct from
ordinary business corporations and as quasi public in character. Thus,
in lieu of their fiduciary relationship in regard to the public the prin-
ciple case 19 raises an interesting point in whether or not a bank could
validly enter into a voting trust agreement prior to enactment of the
amendment of March 1925, without contravening a previous statute.
2 0
This statute, passed nine years prior to sec. 50 of the Stock Corporation
law, prohibits the issuance of a mere proxy of bank stock to bank
officers for any meeting, and accordingly the learned judge 21 in the
lower court held a fortiori irrevocable authority to bank directors to
vote stock over a period of ten years, under a naked trust, must in
reality transgress the legislative declaration of policy inasmuch as bank
directors are officers within the meaning of the statute.
22
The Appellate Division 23 reversed this holding, saying that in so
"Supra, note 14.
' Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 196 N. Y. 134, 89 N. E. 476 (1909).
Craughwell v. Mousam River Trust Co., 113 Me. 531, 95 Atl. 221 (1915).
"Supra, note 1.
' Sec. 26, General Corporation Law, in part. "No officer, clerk, teller
or bookkeeper of a corporation formed under or subject to the banking
law shall act as proxy for any stockholder at any meeting of such corpora-
tion." Derived from L. 1892 ch. 687 which added a new section 21 to the
General Corporation Law. Sec. 26 of the General Corporation Law of 1890,
ch. 563, "When to take effect," was omitted from L. 1892 ch. 687. Now
332.
, Proskauer, J. 214 N. Y. Supp. 643-647 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
"Eastham v. New York State Telephone Co., 86 App. Div. 563 (3d
Dept. 1903); Torbett v. Eaton, 113 N. Y. 623, 20 N. E. 876 (1889); 2 Op.
Atty. Genl. N. Y. (1912) 285.
'Martin, J. 217 N. Y. Sup. 67 (App. Div. 1926). This ruling, that the
amendment was not retroactive in effect, obviated a holding on an interest-
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ruling the court below had disregarded essential differences between
a voting trust and a proxy.2 4 Therefore if the theory that a trust is
nothing more than a collective proxy and revocable as such is good,
then "the many statutes limiting the effective duration of a proxy
would also operate to render totally ineffective a voting trust." To
this doctrine the higher court refused to adhere.
Ultimately the case will appear before the Court of Appeals and
whether that court will agree with the learned opinion of the Nisi
Prius court in holding that a bank voting trust is essentially against
public interest and that therefore the statute should be interpreted as
positively prohibiting such agreements or whether the Appellate Divi-
sion was correct in ruling that the creation of a voting trust agreement
among stockholders of a bank does not contravene public policy and
therefore should be permitted except as absolutely prohibited by statute,
is the precise question.
The only case holding on the subject is the case of Bridgers v.
First National Bank,25 but this case may be regarded as dubious
authority inasmuch as it was decided in a state which holds such agree-
ments void per se.
The basis for the decision of the Court of Appeals will rest upon
public policy and it seems that such agreements in banks must be
regarded as abhorrent to public interest and therefore void per se.
Voting trust agreements in banks are to be placed in the first sub-
division mentioned, and the amendment to the statute takes such agree-
ments outside the limitations.
M. H.
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCES IN NEW YORK-In a late case,'
the facts were: the plaintiff and defendant were residents of, and mar-
ried, in Canada. Defendant subsequently abandoned his wife in Canada
and came to live in Pennsylvania, where after falsely testifying that he
did not know the whereabouts of his wife and securing service of sum-
mons by publication, he obtained a decree of divorce. Subsequent to
this action, the plaintiff moved to New York and established her domicile
there. The defendant remarried and came to New York to live. Plain-
tiff thereupon sued for divorce. Defendant set up Pennsylvania decree
as bar to action. Held-defense was untenable and Pennsylvania decree
was not a bar to the action.
ing point as to the constitutionality of a provision which would effect vested
and inchoate rights, created by contract according to a provision in the
agreement "any stockholder may become a party to this agreement."
Cushing, Voting Trusts (1915) 124; 3 Fletcher, Corporations (1917)2873. 152 N. C. 293, 67 S. E. 770 (1910). In this case a national bank was
involved. The facts are on all fours with the principal case and the proxy
statute in question was Rev. St. sec. 5144 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901 p. 3464).
'Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240 (1926).
